[Report of the Iraq Study Group]
6 December 2006
Executive Summary
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.
There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects
can be improved.
In this report, we make a number of recommendations
for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and
the region. Our most important recommendations call for
new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq
and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S.
forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin
to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe
that these two recommendations are equally important and
reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented,
and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national
reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better
future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be
enhanced in an important part of the world, and America’s
credibility, interests, and values will be protected.
The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence
is increasing in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni
Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda,
and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal
challenge to stability.
The Iraqi people have a democratically elected
government, yet it is not adequately advancing national
reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering
essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.
If the situation continues to deteriorate,
the consequences could be severe. A slide toward chaos could
trigger the collapse of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian
catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia
clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory
and expand its base of operations. The global standing of
the United States could be diminished. Americans could become
more polarized.
During the past nine months we have considered
a full range of approaches for moving forward. All have
flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly
believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics
to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.
External Approach
The policies and actions of Iraq’s
neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. No
country in the region will benefit in the long term from
a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing
enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting
stability.
The United States should immediately launch
a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus
for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort
should include every country that has an interest in avoiding
a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors.
Iraq’s neighbors and key states in and outside the
region should form a support group to reinforce security
and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which
Iraq can achieve on its own.
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence
events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos
in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.
In seeking to influence the behavior of both countries,
the United States has disincentives and incentives available.
Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq,
respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage
national reconciliation. The issue of Iran’s nuclear
programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany.
Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow
of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
The United States cannot achieve its goals
in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli
conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed
and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive
Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President
Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution
for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct
talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians
(those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.
As the United States develops its approach
toward Iraq and the Middle East, the United States should
provide additional political, economic, and military support
for Afghanistan, including resources that might become available
as combat forces are moved out of Iraq.
Internal Approach
The most important questions about Iraq’s
future are now the responsibility of Iraqis. The United
States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi
people to take control of their own destiny.
The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming
responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number
and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is
under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should
significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel,
including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi
Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces
could begin to move out of Iraq.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq
should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which
would take over primary responsibility for combat operations.
By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments
in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades
not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.
At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed
only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction
and special operations teams, and in training, equipping,
advising, force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence
and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those
rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to
undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will
need assistance from the United States for some time to
come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities.
Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government
that the United States could carry out its plans, including
planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did
not implement their planned changes. The United States must
not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers
of American troops deployed in Iraq.
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders
should emphasize training and education of forces that have
returned to the United States in order to restore the force
to full combat capability. As equipment returns to the United
States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to
restore the equipment over the next five years.
The United States should work closely with
Iraq’s leaders to support the achievement of specific
objectives -- or milestones -- on national reconciliation,
security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, but
the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress.
The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens -- and
the citizens of the United States and other countries --
that it deserves continued support.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation
with the United States, has put forward a set of milestones
critical for Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must
be expanded to include milestones that can strengthen the
government and benefit the Iraqi people. President Bush
and his national security team should remain in close and
frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear
message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government
to make substantial progress toward the achievement of these
milestones.
If the Iraqi government demonstrates political
will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement
of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and
governance, the United States should make clear its willingness
to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s
security forces and to continue political, military, and
economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make
substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones
on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the
United States should reduce its political, military, or
economic support for the Iraqi government.
Our report makes recommendations in several
other areas. They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal
justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget process, the training of
U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence capabilities.
Conclusion
It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study
Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward
for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive
and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They
should not be separated or carried out in isolation. The
dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as events
within Iraq.
The challenges are daunting. There will
be difficult days ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward,
Iraq, the region, and the United States of America can emerge
stronger.
(end text)
###
