During its economic heyday in the first
half of the 20th century, Uruguay was often called the “Switzerland
of Latin America.” While economic crises have challenged
its social fabric, on a regional basis Uruguay still does
remarkably well in most social, economic and political indicators.
Like Switzerland, it is also often called on to be a neutral
broker in regional and international fora, where it enjoys
the esteem of the United States (US) and other countries.
As host of the Uruguay Round of world trade talks in the
1980s, and seat of regional organizations such as MERCOSUR,
the South American common market, and ALADI, the Latin American
Integration Association, and as the world’s largest
per capita contributor of peacekeeping forces, Uruguay is
a more important player in world affairs than its size might
indicate.
After enduring a military dictatorship from 1973-1985,
Uruguay has firmly re-established its two hundred year tradition
of constitutional democracy, political pluralism and individual
liberties. Its international relations historically have
been guided by the principles of non-intervention, multilateralism,
respect for national sovereignty and international law.
The interpretation of these principles continues to define
the relationship Uruguay has with the United States, drawing
it closer or distancing it from “the North”
depending on the course of international events. Traditionally,
however, while sharing many American values, Uruguay has
had stronger political, economic and cultural links with
its neighbors and Europe—where a majority of its citizens
have their roots—than with the US. Only in recent
years, and largely through growing commercial linkages and
globalization, have Uruguay’s ties to North America
noticeably strengthened.
Since the end of the dictatorship, Uruguay has worked cooperatively
with the United States bilaterally and internationally,
while manifesting its differences freely when its national
interests are at stake. Under President Jorge Batlle (2000-2005),
Uruguay was particularly open to increasing ties with the
United States, and he met three times with President Bush.
Batlle’s government sponsored resolutions on human
rights in Cuba and was a positive force in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), in Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
negotiations and on Summit of the Americas goals. The US,
in the period encompassing the Batlle administration, granted
Uruguay a $1.5 billion loan during its 2002 financial crisis,
and expedited re-approval of beef exports to the US after
an outbreak of foot and mouth disease. In 2002, Uruguay
and the US formed the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment
(JCTI) to discuss economic and commercial topics of mutual
interest. The JCTI discussions led to the signing of a Bilateral
Investment Treaty in October 2004, which currently awaits
legislative ratification. In the same month, the US and
Uruguay also signed an Open Skies Agreement, and as of this
writing a Science and Technology Agreement is pending final
approval by the Uruguayan government.
One bump in these positive developments has been Uruguay’s
inability thus far to sign an agreement under Article 98
of the statutes of the International Criminal Court. This
agreement would exempt US persons from surrender to the
court’s jurisdiction. As required by US law, failure
to reach such an agreement has led to the cut off of most
military assistance to Uruguay. Although this was a blow
to Uruguay’s military, this has not affected the overall
positive tenor of bilateral military relations, and discussions
on such an agreement are still being contemplated. The US
remains appreciative of Uruguay’s record of international
peacekeeping, and cooperation in other security areas, such
as terrorism, counternarcotics and international crime,
remains strong.
Although Batlle’s ties with the US undoubtedly helped
the Uruguayan economy at a crucial time, they did not have
a similar effect on his popularity. A majority of Uruguayans
recognized that bilateral relations with the US were good
under Batlle (generally about 80 percent); nevertheless,
few had a favorable impression of the US (generally less
than 40 percent). Influenced by US actions in Iraq and with
their strong social democratic and multilateralist traditions,
many Uruguayans criticize the US as unilateralist, and perceive
the US as trying to dominate the hemisphere. For example,
80 percent of Uruguayans were opposed to the Iraq war (according
to a 2003 Gallup poll of several dozen countries). Nonetheless,
there is little hostility to Americans in general, and with
increasing emigration to the US by Uruguayans and growing
US tourist arrivals in Uruguay, some of these misperceptions
are bound to diminish.
This complicated and somewhat paradoxical relationship
has much to do with Latin American history, from the Monroe
Doctrine down to the years of dictatorship. As elsewhere
in the hemisphere, the suspicions of US motives are less
prevalent in the classes with relatively close ties to the
US, such as the business sector. However, in Uruguay, a
negative view of American motives and actions is not uncommon
across a wide educational spectrum, from the less educated
poor to highly educated leftist intellectuals, and it is
particularly strong among those who suffered under the dictatorship.
Whether it is based on lack of knowledge of the US or ideology,
softening this sentiment will continue to take a concerted
effort by opinion makers on both sides.
The recent election of Tabare Vazquez as the first leftist
President in the history of Uruguay presents a number of
challenges and opportunities for US policy. Countering negative
sentiment toward America is but one. Though fully open to
dialogue, it is undeniable that President Vazquez and his
coalition are cooler to some US policies than are the traditional
centrist parties. While we are hopeful and expectant of
very positive relations with Vazquez, the bilateral relationship
will likely be different than it was under President Batlle.
Much will depend on specific bilateral initiatives; however,
Vazquez’s relations with his Latin American neighbors
and support for US hemispheric initiatives also will be
an important factor. In this regard, his administration’s
relations with Cuba and Venezuela will be of particular
interest to Washington. We are hopeful that Uruguay’s
strong views on human rights will come into play in these
situations.
To balance the disparate seven major parties within his
Frente Amplio coalition, Vazquez appointed several traditional
socialists and former Tupamaro guerrillas to cabinet posts,
as well as prominent moderates. For bilateral relations
with the US, the two key ministers in his cabinet are Minister
of Foreign Relations Reinaldo Gargano and Minister of Finance
and Economy, Danilo Astori. These experienced politicians
have sometimes manifested opposing views on Uruguay’s
international relations, so President Vazquez will be called
on to set the overall tone.
Astori has received high marks from the international financial
institutions and most of his international interlocutors,
and it appears that Uruguayan macroeconomic policy will
largely follow the same macro path it did under the Batlle
administration. As other governments in the region have
shown, governing from the left is not incompatible with
pro-growth policies. As such, there will be few discrepancies
in the macroeconomic area with the US. Astori’s ministry
also may take an active role in trade, investment and commercial
policy.
Gargano has stressed the need for close commercial ties,
but has freely manifested his differences with a number
of US policies. He has vowed to prioritize regional integration
in South America, and has not clearly voiced his support
for the FTAA. The coming months will give a clearer picture
of whether the Vazquez administration can combine its regional
activism with larger hemispheric initiatives such as the
Summit of the Americas, of which the FTAA is but one important
part. There are several potential areas of policy agreement
between the Secretary Condoleezza Rice-led State Department
and the Minister Reinaldo Gargano-led Uruguayan Foreign
Ministry. These include cooperation on terrorism, international
crime and international security issues such as peacekeeping,
as well as support for democracy, human rights and economic
development worldwide. There may be important nuances and
differences in strategy, but many of the goals should be
similar.
A final important ingredient in US-Uruguayan bilateral
relations is how the new government will fit into the regional
context. There are a number of different visions for South
America, including among Uruguay’s neighbors. Vazquez
recognizes the importance of the commercial relationship
with the United States and will have to decide where Uruguay’s
national interests lie, balancing his heartfelt belief in
regional unity with other economic and political realities.
Since Vazquez’s party has never been in power, many
of the foreign policy issues it faces are new and its final
foreign policy stances will take time to develop. Vazquez
will pursue that which is in Uruguay’s national interest,
while balancing the different views within his coalition.
There is substantial room for cooperation with the US—cooperation
that is beneficial for both parties and for the hemisphere
in general. It is my sincere hope that Uruguay, which is
blessed with an educated populace and still remains mostly
free from the intractable problems of many Latin states,
will remain a constructive interlocutor and partner for
the US and a positive example in the hemisphere.
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